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Abstract The ways of decision-making within the EU have significantly changed
in the last decades: The rule of unanimity has been more and more substituted by
majority voting in order to speed up decision-making processes in a Union of 27
heterogeneous member states. A third possibility is now offered by the Lisbon Treaty
including a constitutional right of withdrawal. A member state encountering a loss in
its benefits caused by a decision made by majority voting may now demand com-
pensating transfers by using the right of withdrawal. It might threaten to leave the EU
if the compensation is denied. Hence, does this mean that member states now have
regained a negotiation power comparable to the right to veto? Using a game theoretic
approach we investigate the amount of compensating transfers to be offered under
majority decisions with exit option compared to decisions requiring unanimity.
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1 Introduction1
For the first time since the foundation of the European Community more than 50
years ago, an explicit option of withdrawal from the Community has been set down
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in the Treaty of Lisbon, article 50. This act is a novelty since neither are any details
concerning withdrawal processes laid down in previous treaties the European Union
(EU), nor does the International Law give any specific guidelines.
In fact, during the integration process that started with the foundation of the
European Community no country has withdrawn from the community.2 However,
the European integration process faces new challenges due to numerous enlarge-
ments: The objectives and institutional regulations set up for the initial Community
consisting of six neighbouring national economies at a quite similar stage of
development are partly losing relevance in a more heterogeneous Community of
now 27 member states. Unanimity decision-making becomes increasingly difficult.
The majority decisions brought in to solve this problem may lead to the scenario of
a country being outvoted several times and getting increasingly unsatisfied with the
membership conditions. The option of withdrawal might become a serious
alternative for this country and at the same time reduce tensions within the
Community.
The latest developments during the ratification process for the Treaty of Lisbon
also support the importance of a (future) right of withdrawal: The Irish citizens’
refusal (still valid so far) of the Reform Treaty as well as the critical attitude of
Poland and the Czech Republic have caused discussions showing a wide range of
possible consequences with excluding states reluctant to support reforms on one end
and founding a new European Union without them on the other.
The right of withdrawal is a new instrument for the member states which on the
one hand helps them to oppose to excessive EU centralization tendencies—which
strengthens the principle of subsidiarity (Buchanan and Faith 1987, p. 1031)—and
that on the other hand can be used as a threat in order to impede decisions or to at
least enforce compensations for a decision taken against their interests. Does this
mean that member states now have regained a negotiation power comparable to the
right to veto or are they becoming even more powerful by threatening to leave? This
study provides an answer to these questions. It is organized as follows: Sect. 2 first
deals with the relevance of a withdrawal by assessing the costs and benefits coming
along with EU membership and then refers to the threat of withdrawal. Section 3
presents the model which is applied to three different voting schemes: unanimity
voting, majority voting without an exit option and majority voting with an exit
option. The obtained results are modified in Sects. 4 and 5 by dropping certain
assumptions of the basic model. Section 6 concludes.
2 The relevance of the exit option
More than 50 years ago, European integration started with six member states but
since then the community has been extended to 27 members. According to theory, if
2 Referring to the withdrawal of Greenland from the EU, Berglund (2006, pp. 157) shows in her essay
that a withdrawal from the Union is in principle possible. On the other hand, since Greenland was no
autonomous member state of the EU, it can also be argued that the Greenland action was a member state’s
reduction in size and therefore not a withdrawal of a member state according to the European Community
Law.
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regional integration increases, (political) costs of coordination rise due to more
heterogeneity in preferences. Regions whose preferences are not considered
adequately by the central decision-making may have the incentive to leave (Alesina
and Spolaore 2003). Applied to the EU, withdrawal of a member state could become
an option when the advantages of EU-membership are dominated by the advantages
of being a non EU-member. Whether such relevance is given will be discussed in
Sect. 2.1. Besides that, the right of withdrawal could also be used as a threat in order
to obtain concessions for staying in the community, thus fostering the bargaining
power of member states. Whether this holds true will be analyzed in Sect. 2.2.
2.1 A cost-benefit analysis of the EU membership
There are economic as well as non-economic reasons for a country to withdraw
from an integration area such as the EU. Non-economic factors are, among others,
conflicts arising from different attitudes towards religion, language, culture or
ethnicity (Bookmann 1993, pp. 12). Other reasons originate, for example, in
restricted civil rights or privileges no longer accepted by a state (Sunstein 1991,
pp. 655). This analysis will, however, not concentrate on these non-economic
reasons but rather on the economic reasons in the broad sense because ‘‘[…]
economic factors are responsible, at least partially, for the birth of secessionist
movements that at first glance seem to be driven purely by nationalistic motives
[…]’’ (Alexandrakis and Jones 2006, p. 400).
For every EU member state, the membership brings along economic benefits as
well as disadvantages that result in state-specific cost-benefit relations. In case of
withdrawal, the membership benefits are lost and can therefore be equated with the
(opportunity) costs of a non-membership (outside position). Accordingly, the
(opportunity) costs of a membership are based on the benefits resulting from an
independent position outside the Community.
A state’s economic benefits caused by the EU membership are defined (among
others) by the following elements (Ahrens et al. 2005, pp. 421):
• Benefits of the European Single Market: This concerns trade and specialization
gains through unrestricted free trade as well as the improved allocation of
resources through the unhindered mobility of the production factors labour and
capital within the integration area.
• Benefits of the regional and structural policy: This refers to the financial support
by the EU with the aims of reducing regional income differences and
establishing convergence.
• Benefits of the Common Agricultural Policy through a reliable supply with
agricultural goods as well as the stabilization of the agricultural markets within
the integration area.
• Benefits of the Monetary Union: This applies to the reduction of transaction
costs in trade and capital movements due to the common European currency, as
well as the omission of exchange rate risks and risk premiums—along with the
associated positive allocation effects.
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• Benefits of the EU trade policy towards third countries concerning the fact that
the EU membership results in a stronger bargaining position.
• Benefits that are caused inherently by the EU membership: This refers, among
others, to the fact that the member state participates in the integration process
itself, is part of the decision-making process with regard to the depth of
integration as well as to the admission of new members, has an increased
negotiation power towards outsiders and benefits from the Community’s
protection.
The benefits of the non-membership (opportunity costs of membership) are
defined, among others, by the following elements:
• Benefits of independency through the advantages of a sovereign and autonomic
economic policy based on its specific preferences and requirements.
• Benefits of the autonomous use of state revenues concerning the fact that no
payments to the EU budget have to be made.
• Benefits of an autonomous foreign trade policy referring to the fact that specific
economic and monetary agreements with third countries are possible and that the
advantages of an independent monetary policy can be exploited.
The comparison of benefits between the EU membership and an outside position
can therefore be considered to be the decisive element to the question of whether a
membership is (still) benefit maximising.3 Furthermore, the question whether the
EU membership is really benefit maximising to a country becomes relevant on and
off since the EU keeps changing the cost-benefit relations of its members by taking
various decisions in the course of the enlargement and deepening processes. And
one or other of these decisions may tip the scales between the advantages of staying
or leaving the EU.
2.2 The exit option as threat potential
In case exogenous or endogenous factors cause a modification of the cost-benefit
relation and the value of a Union membership decreases, the option of a withdrawal
becomes relevant. As mentioned before, the latest enlargements could be a reason
since they lead to a higher heterogeneity of the member countries with regard to
structure and preferences. This heterogeneity is reflected in decision-making
processes becoming more and more difficult. The Treaty of Lisbon may also cause
new conflicts: due to the enshrined appreciation of decisions based on superior
majorities, the danger of member states being outvoted more often and their cost-
benefit balance getting out of balance is rising. In case these outvoting situations
cumulate it might become difficult for a member state to further participate in the
integration process.
3 One-time costs following a withdrawal (e.g. for re-establishing border controls, replacing the common
European currency by the national currency etc.) have to be taken into account too. Actually these
expenses are not significant with respect to the complete ‘‘running time’’ of the outside position. But, as
they incur at the date of withdrawal and with the politicians’ perception of time as short election periods
they mostly were taken as crucial.
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These developments can thus lead to a decreased benefit of the EU membership
(Farvaque 2000, p. 6) or to an increased benefit of the non-membership for a specific
country. In the latter case, two scenarios are possible: either the benefit of being a
sovereign state outside the EU is regarded as more valuable than before or the
membership in another integration area is regarded as more promising with regard
to benefit than the membership in the EU. In both scenarios, a withdrawal might be
considered.
If such significant changes in a member country’s cost-benefit relation do occur,
the country will initially try to have the EU compensate these changes. Therefore,
the member country will make certain claims and threaten to withdraw should these
claims not be met. The member state thus uses the right of withdrawal as a potential
right to veto or as a threat potential in order to prevent disadvantageous decisions or,
alternatively, to receive compensations for accepting the decision as a necessary
part of the integration process.4
At the time of a member state asserting its claims, it is—due to existing
information asymmetries—not obvious to the EU (being regarded as representation
of the other member states) what kind of changes in the cost-benefit relation of the
specific state will actually occur. This circumstance may induce a member state to
assert unjustified claims in order to raise its own benefit position compared to other
member states. With the help of the enshrined withdrawal option, a country can
therefore obtain advantages to the account of other member states.
The previous integration process has seen some threats of withdrawal so far: In
1965, de Gaulle with his ‘‘policy of the empty chair’’ threatened to withdraw should
the unanimity rule not be enshrined in the European Council’s resolution passing
proceedings. This threat was preceded by a qualified majority refusal of French
agricultural proposals. The European Union and France came to an agreement, the
Luxembourg Compromise of 1966, leading to the budget being reallocated in favor
of agricultural measures.
Great Britain indirectly threatened to withdraw in order to obtain concessions:
Since joining the EU in 1973, the country made high contributions to the EU
budget5 but was allocated only a small amount out of the agricultural fund
composing 75% of the overall budget at that time. Since Great Britain’s agricultural
structure only represents a small part of its economy, the country could obtain only
poor means out of the agricultural fund and was additionally more restricted by the
Common Agricultural Policy than other member states. The EU established a
compensation mechanism in 1984—the so-called British rebate. Thatcher
threatened to hold a referendum for continuance in the Union or to withdraw
should there be no payment facilities for Great Britain.
4 The numerous package deals and side payments used as instruments in the negotiation processes are
two examples of this procedure. The question whether these payments are justified or not shall not be
elaborated here.
5 Great Britain imported many goods from Commonwealth States, which increased duty and agricultural
levy payments to the EU. Furthermore, consumption was very high with regard to the British GNP, which
resulted in higher VAT own resources to be paid to the EU budget.
Eur J Law Econ (2011) 32:357–375 361
123
The examples listed above as well as the latest developments in the ratification
process of the Treaty of Lisbon shed light on the future relevance of the threat to
withdraw with an explicit withdrawal option at hand.
In the next section, a model will be presented that answers the question as to
whether member states will be able to (re)gain bargaining power—in terms of
compensation offers—if they can make use of the right of withdrawal in different
decision-making processes. The chosen analytical framework is game theoretic.
Schneider and Cederman (1994) as well as Slapin (2009) have already presented
exit games but they do not consider different modes of decision-making. We fill that
gap by using an ultimatum game which enables us to show—dependent on the
respective decision-making scenario—how much compensation will be offered by
the EU to an unwilling member state in order to carry through the planned decision
and/or to prevent its exit.
3 The model
Our analysis is based on a simple game theoretic approach. We start with an
upcoming decision (E) which should be made in the European Union. This decision
will increase the benefits (U) for all member states Mi of the EU except of member




Mi UEU ) Benefits of all member states of the EU without M1
We assume:
dUM1ðE)\0 and dUEUðE) [ 0; with ð1Þ
dUEUðE) [ 0j j[ dUM1ðE)\0j j: ð2Þ
In case the decision (E) is made member state M1 will demand compensation
(v)6 that will benefit M1 and harm the EU symmetrically:
dUM1ðv) [ 0 and dUEUðv)\0; assuming for simplicity that ð3Þ
dUM1ðv) ¼ dUEUðv)j j: ð4Þ
The decision (E) will be made at time t = 0. In the next period, at t = 1, the
decision becomes effective. Based on that the following utility functions can be
derived:
UM1ðt ¼ 1Þ ¼ UM1ðt ¼ 0Þ þ dUM1ðEÞ þ dUM1ðvÞ; with ð5Þ
UM1(t = 0) = Overall benefit of EU membership for M1 in t = 0
UM1(t = 1) = Overall benefit of EU membership for M1 in t = 1
UEUðt ¼ 1Þ ¼ UEUðt ¼ 0Þ þ dUEUðE) þ dUEUðv); with ð6Þ
6 For simplicity we define compensation in monetary dimensions, though it also could be a political
concession.
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UEU(t = 0) = Overall benefit of EU membership for the remaining member states
(EU) in t = 0
UEU(t = 1) = Overall benefit of EU membership for the remaining member states
(EU) in t = 1
We consider three decision-making scenarios:
1. Decisions requiring unanimity, i.e. individual member states may veto
2. Majority voting system without exit option
3. Majority voting system with exit option
3.1 The rule of unanimity and the option to veto
If the decision requires unanimity, the member state M1 may veto and stop it. As the
decision would increase the benefits for almost all member states the EU should
offer M1 a transfer (v) compensating M1 for its loss in benefits. The critical point is
the amount of the compensation (v) that will keep M1 from using its right to veto.
For further insight the situation can be modelled with the help of the ultimatum
game in which the following assumptions are made:
• two players (EU and M1)
• Both players know each other.
• Both players have complete information with respect to the changes in benefits
occurring in the course of the decision.
• The EU is the proposer offering a concrete amount of compensating transfers
whereas M1 is the responder who either accepts or rejects.
• The game is played sequentially.
• There is no bargaining.7
• The game is only played once.8
Assuming rational behaviour M1 should accept any offered compensation
satisfying the condition dUM1ðv) [ dUM1ðE)j j as a result of this ‘‘take-it-or-leave-it
game’’. The EU should offer the lowest possible amount complying with
dUEUðE) [ dUEUðv)j j; i.e. the benefit of the decision made must be higher than
the loss of the provided transfer; if not, the decision will not be implemented. The
amount offered is marginally higher than v*, with v* leaving the country M1 to be
indifferent between vetoing and agreement:
dUM1ðv*) ¼ dUM1ðE)j j: ð7Þ
In that case, the net benefit of the decision and the provided transfer is marginally
higher than 0 for member state M1 while the net benefit gain for the EU is at its
maximum.
7 Realistically, this assumption does not hold because bargaining does take place in the EU, in fact, more
than enough. Anyhow, for reasons of simplification we disallow for bargaining.
8 Realistically, those games are played all the time within the EU, but with changing decisions and
different member states as responder.
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Gu¨th et al. (1982) carried out some experimental studies showing that players
often behave differently to what theory actually suggests: if the proposer offered too
little (below 20–30% of the amount to be redistributed), the responder punished him
by rejecting the offer—with the consequence that neither of them received anything.
In addition the proposer—of his own accord—also often cared about fairness by
offering the responder a higher amount (between 30 and 50% of the amount to be
redistributed).
Taking these results into account the EU9 should offer a compensation amount
(v) consisting of two components (v* ? x), with x being a significant additional
amount. The highest possible additional payment (x*) is determined by the
condition that the EU is indifferent between implementing the decision and paying
the transfer, and not implementing it. To ensure a positive benefit from
implementing the decision the EU must only offer a compensation allowance x
which is lower than x*.
dUEU v* þ xð Þj j\dUEUðE); with ð8Þ
x\x* and x* corresponding to : dUEU(v* þ x*)j j ¼ dUEUðE): ð9Þ
If the EU offers a positive x, but too low, M1 will not accept and veto; the
decision benefiting the majority of the member states will not be implemented,
though both players would have been better off with the decision and the transfer.10
As a consequence, the rule of unanimity enables M1 to get compensation (v)
consisting of (v* ? x), where x increases its benefits additionally at the expense of
the other member states: v* \ v = v* ? x \ (v* ? x*), with v* and (v* ? x*)
defining the respective limits of compensation.
3.2 Majority voting system without an exit option
Due to the enlargement processes, the rule of unanimity has been more and more
substituted by majority voting in order to speed up decision-making in a Union of 27
heterogeneous member states. A decision can be realized despite the opposition of
one or more member states. We assume again that a decision (E) benefits the majority
of the member states except of M1 which experiences a loss. Based on that there is no
need to offer compensation to M1 (v = 0) because there is no right of veto:
UM1ðt ¼ 1Þ ¼ UM1ðt ¼ 0Þ þ dUM1ðE) with UM1ðt ¼ 1Þ\UM1ðt ¼ 0Þ ð10Þ
UEUðt ¼ 1Þ ¼ UEUðt ¼ 0Þ þ dUEUðE) with UEUðt ¼ 1Þ[ UEUðt ¼ 0Þ: ð11Þ
In order to meet concerns of fairness, the EU might offer some kind of
compensation which is, however,—especially in a one-shot game—lower compared
9 The experimental studies assume that individuals behave in that way. We adopt that approach for the
behaviour of states even though we are aware of possible problems going along with that adoption.
Besides that, we consider the EU as an individual representing the interests of all member states except of
M1. In order to reduce the complexity we refrain from modelling a two-level game where the decision-
making processes among the remaining member states of what to offer M1 as a transfer is analysed.
10 Thaler (1988) and Roth (1995) present a comprehensive overview on experiments within the
framework of ultimatum games. Stahl (2008, p. 293) discusses some reasons why players act irrationally,
for example, fairness, envy and social preferences.
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to the situation of unanimity rule and ranges between 0 \ v = x  (v* ? x*). In a
one-shot game M1 will accept that offer—no matter how much it will receive
because any rejection will cause harm to it and will not punish the proposer for too
low an offer.
3.3 Majority voting system with an exit option
The Treaty of Lisbon now enables member states to withdraw from the Union; that
means M1 may therefore use this outside-option in its negotiation with the EU. If
M1 decided to withdraw, the expected utility functions of M1 and the EU would
change as follows:
UM1ðt ¼ 1Þ ¼ UM1ðEU) with ð12Þ
UM1(-EU) = overall benefit of M1 after having left the EU, with the restriction
that UM1(-EU) \ UM1(t = 0) (because otherwise M1 would not be a member of
the EU even now).
UEUðt ¼ 1Þ ¼ UEUðt ¼ 0Þ þ dUEUðE) þ dUEUðM1) with ð13Þ
dUEU(-M1) \ 0 = The change in the benefits of EU membership for the remaining
member states after M1 has left the union.
If M1 decided to leave the integration area, the remaining states would gain less
from integration because, for example, the Single Market would become smaller,
their bargaining power with respect to third party countries would decrease or, if M1
were a net contributor, their financial means would suffer a loss. These welfare
losses are normally the higher, the larger the withdrawing country is, the longer the
exiting state has been a member (especially if it is one of the founding members) or
the higher its per-capita income is compared to the average.
Indeed M1’s outside-option is realistic if UM1ðEU) [ UM1ðt ¼ 0Þ þ dUM1ðE),11
which means that staying in the Union and accepting the decision is less beneficial
compared to being a sovereign country again.12 In contrast to that, the EU is
interested in keeping M1 from withdrawing as dUEUðM1)\0:
Against this background, two cases must be distinguished:
Scenario a: dUEUðE) [ dUEUðM1)j j:
The decision is so favourable to the remaining EU member states that its
accompanying benefits are considered higher than the loss they would experience if
M1 were to leave.
Scenario b: dUEUðE)\ dUEUðM1)j j:
The decision is less favourable to the remaining EU member states as its
accompanying benefits do not compensate for the loss they would experience if M1
were to leave.
11 Exactly, we should also include one-time exit costs (j) into our consideration. But we ignore them
here as they do not have any qualitative effects on the results.
12 In the case that UM1(-EU) \ UM1(t = 0) ? dUM1(E), i.e. the overall benefit of being a member state
of the Union outweighs the benefits of withdrawal despite the loss of benefits caused by the decision, the
threat to exit is not credible.
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3.3.1 Scenario a: The withdrawal of M1 causes only a small loss in the benefits
of the EU
If dUEUðE) [ dUEUðM1)j j holds, the EU will implement the decision by all
means, even if M1 decides to terminate its membership. But as a withdrawal will
reduce the overall benefit, the EU is interested in offering M1 adequate
compensation (v) to prevent the exit. A member state suffering from a decision
made by majority voting may now demand compensating transfers by using the
right of withdrawal: it might threaten to leave the EU if adequate compensation is
refused (Knez and Camerer 1995, p. 66). M1 as the responder may now effectively
influence the behaviour of the EU as the proposer (Fellner and Gu¨th 2003, p. 54).
Our previous ultimatum game will be modified as follows:
Behaving rationally M1 should accept any compensation (v) that complies with:
UM1ðt ¼ 1Þ ¼ UM1ðt ¼ 0Þ þ dUM1ðE) þ dUM1ðv) [ UM1ðEU) ð14Þ
which means that
dUM1ðv) [  dUM1ðE)  ðUM1ðt ¼ 0Þ  UM1ðEU)): ð14aÞ
The transfer should put M1 in the place that being member of the EU is more
valuable—at least marginally—to it than the outside option. Therefore the transfer
(v) only has to put M1 marginally better off compared to its outside option. A
complete compensation based on M1’s loss incurred by the decision is not necessary!
The EU, in turn, will offer the lowest possible payment satisfying
dUEUðv)j j\ dUEUðM1)j j; which means that the offered transfer should reduce
the benefits of the EU less than the imminent exit of M1.
Thus the offered transfer would only be marginally higher than v**, with v**
resulting from
UM1ðt ¼ 1Þ ¼ UM1ðt ¼ 0Þ þ dUM1ðE) þ dUM1ðv**) ¼ UM1ðEU) or ð15Þ
dUM1ðv**) ¼ dUM1ðE)  ðUM1ðt ¼ 0Þ  UM1ðEU)) ð15aÞ
v** symbolizes the amount of the transfer leaving M1 indifferent between
withdrawing ðUM1ðEU)) or staying UM1ðt ¼ 0Þ þ dUM1ðE) þ dUM1ðv**)):
The net change in benefits for M1 based on the decision and the offered
transfer is still negative but not serious enough to overcompensate the advantage
of EU membership compared to the outside option. The net gain in benefits for
the EU, however, based on the decision and the promised transfer is at a
maximum. The offered compensation will be lower compared to the decision rule
of unanimity as (v** \ v*), but it will be higher compared to the majority voting
system without exit option, because in that case, rationally, no compensation
should be offered.
However, as experiments have shown players may act irrationally. M1 may reject
an offer considered as too low, though this rejection would lead to a decrease in
benefits for both M1 and the EU. In that case, the EU should offer a compensating
transfer (v) composed of (v** ? z) with z being a significant additional amount. But
such compensation will only be offered, if the loss of benefits caused by the transfer
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is smaller than the loss of benefits caused by an exit of M1. Thus the highest
possible premium (z*) follows from the condition that the EU is indifferent between
paying the transfer and accepting the exit of M1. To ensure compensation offered by
the EU, the premium z must be, at least marginally, smaller than z*:
dUEUðv** þ z)j j\ dUEUðM1)j j with ð16Þ
z\z* and z* corresponding to dUEUðv   þ zÞj j ¼ dUEUð  M1)j j: ð17Þ
When referring to experiments in the setting of ultimatum games, it can be
concluded that z would be equal to around 30% of the loss the EU experiences if M1
withdrew (dUEU(-M1)).
In scenario a, the majority voting system with exit option enables M1 to get
a compensation amount (v) consisting of (v** ? z) with v** \ v = v** ?
z \ v** ? z*. This transfer may now even overcompensate the loss in benefits of
M1 in the course of the decision and therefore increase its overall benefit of EU
membership. The probability of such a high transfer rises as dUEUðM1)j j increases
and dUM1ðE)j j decreases.
3.3.2 Scenario b: The withdrawal of M1 causes a significant loss in the benefits
of the EU
If dUEUðE)\ dUEUðM1)j j holds, the EU is willing to do everything that is possible
to avoid M1’s withdrawal from the EU because its exit would imply a high loss of
benefits for the remaining member states, which would overcompensate the gains
from the decision (E).
The amount the EU may afford for compensation is determined by
dUEUðv)j j  dUEUðE): the benefits caused by the decision must overcompensate
the loss in benefits caused by the transfer. If the EU had to pay a higher
compensation, the net benefit from realizing the decision and making the
compensation payment would become negative; instead of implementing a very
costly decision it would be rational then to abandon the decision and to avoid paying
any kind of transfer.
Being well informed about the utility function of M1, the EU would be aware of
whether there exists a transfer v complying with dUEUðv)j j  dUEUðE) and at the
same time fulfilling the restriction
dUM1ðv) [  dUM1ðE)  ðUM1ðt ¼ 0Þ  UM1ðEU)): ð14Þ
These constraints and the assumption that
dUM1ðv) ¼ dUEUðv)j j lead to ð4Þ
dUEUðE) [ dUM1ðv) [  dUM1ðE)  ðUM1ðt ¼ 0Þ  UM1ðEU)) or ð18Þ
dUEUðE) [  dUM1ðE)  ðUM1ðt ¼ 0Þ  UM1ðEU)): ð18aÞ
In order to realize the decision the gain in benefits for the EU (caused by the
decision) must be higher than the loss in benefits for M1 (caused by the decision)
reduced by its previous difference in benefits between membership and outside
position.
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The inequality (18a) is not fulfilled if:
• EU’s benefits from the decision (dUEU(E)) are very small and/or
• M1’s loss caused by the decision (dUM1(E)) is very high and/or
• M1’s loss of withdrawal (UM1(t = 0) - UM1(-EU)) is very small.
In that case, the EU will not implement the decision as the loss of benefits
connected with the necessary compensation payment exceeds the benefits induced
by the decision. If the inequality (18a) holds, however, the EU will implement the
decision and pay compensation.
As dUEUðM1)j j[ dUEUðE) determines scenario b, inequality (18a) can be
modified:
dUEUðM1)j j[ dUEUðE) [  dUM1ðE)  ðUM1ðt ¼ 0Þ  UM1ðEU)): ð19Þ
When combining (19) with (9), (15a) and (7) the following inequality can be
derived:
dUEUðv** þ z*)j j[ dUEUðv* þ x*)j j[ dUM1ðv**): ð20Þ
The EU’s loss in utility is higher when M1 withdraws than when the decision is
implemented and a transfer is offered to M1. If this inequality holds the EU at most
can offer a compensation amount that equals the decision’s benefits: v B v* ? x*.
Here, M1’s compensation could be as high as in the case of unanimity voting.
3.3.3 First conclusions
Using a game theoretical model where the EU acts as the proposer and M1 as the
responder and where both behave in a purely rational and benefit-maximizing way,
we could show that compensating transfers will be lower under majority decisions
with exit option compared to decisions requiring unanimity. If the rule of unanimity
is applied, the minimum compensation transfer v* depends on M1’s loss in benefits
caused by the decision. In the majority voting system with an exit option, the
minimum compensation amount v** is also determined by the loss in benefits for
M1 but reduced by the difference in benefits between its membership (before the
decision) and its outside position.
If the minimum compensation exceeds EU’s benefits of the decision, no
compensation will be offered: Either the decision will not be implemented because
dUEUðE)\ dUEUðM1)j j or the decision will be made and the exit of M1 is
accepted because dUEUðE) [ dUEUðM1)j j:
Considering experiments with the ultimatum game, it can be argued that M1 will
receive higher compensating transfers than theory suggests. The maximum amount
the EU is willing to pay in the case of majority voting with exit option (v** ? z*)
can be equal to or smaller than the maximum transfer offered in the case of
unanimity (v* ? x*). In the case of unanimity the offer depends on the benefits the
decision implies for the majority of the members. With the exit option, the offer
may also depend on those benefits (if dUEUðE)\ dUEUðM1)j j) or on the loss in
benefits for all the other member states caused by an exit of M1 (if
dUEUðE) [ dUEUðM1)j j). In the last-mentioned case the maximum compensation
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premium is smaller than in the case of unanimity voting. In any case, however, the
maximum amounts will not be outbidden.
4 Extensions of the model: joined claiming and repeated negotiations
for compensation
When extending the model, special emphasis can be put on the question on how the
negotiation powers of proposer and responder change if, instead of a single country
demanding compensation, several countries unite to assert a joint claim. Moreover,
it might be interesting to ask which results—especially with regard to the amount of
compensation claims—can be expected if negotiations between the EU and M1 are
allowed. These questions are relevant as not only bargaining but also group claims
for compensation shape the decision-making processes in the EU. One example for
the latter is the institution of the cohesion fund in 1993: Portugal, Ireland, Greece
and Spain demanded financial support for their consent to the Maastricht treaty.
If not a single country but a group of several countries demands compensating
transfers, different aspects need to be taken into consideration. First of all, it needs
to be discussed how compensation should take place. Until now, countries have
been compensated individually. In the model, the EU will be able to offer any
amount as long as it still receives a (marginal) benefit out of the decision. If too
many countries demand compensation, the offered amount might not be enough to
compensate everyone, thus it would be rational for the EU to drop the decision. At
that point it therefore needs to be discussed whether the decision in question should
really be made when (too) many countries ask for compensation. Besides individual
compensation, the group of countries could also be compensated as a whole. The
group would be offered an amount that could nearly be equivalent to the benefit the
EU would derive from the decision. How the group would share that compensation
is out of reach of the EU. EU has not yet pursued such a strategy, but it could be
worth considering if more and more countries demand compensation. In that case
the EU must only refer to the group compensation transfer and can leave the split-up
to the group.
The group of countries may also think of adopting a decision rule on whether to
accept or reject the offer together. In case of a disjunctive decision rule, the
agreement of just one member state is needed for that the decision might pass and
the respective transfer is paid to every member state of the group. In that case the
compensation offer must only be high enough to satisfy that country with the lowest
loss in benefits caused by the planned decision. If, however, a conjunctive decision
rule is chosen, every member state has to consent to the offer (Messick et al. 1997,
p. 87). In the case of unanimity voting the group should select a conjunctive
decision rule. In the case of majority voting, however, the offer of the EU depends
on the member state that has the most credible outside-option. Taking that into
account, member states might form strategic alliances—by convincing such a
powerful member state to join their group—in order to increase their threatening
potential.
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Another important extension of the model is to admit bargaining between M1 and
the EU. In doing so, M1 can reject the offer of the EU and may demand higher
compensation. If bargaining rounds are finite—and no bargaining costs occur—the
player making the last offer wins, as the other player may either accept or reject the
offer. If, however, bargaining rounds are infinite—and bargaining costs accrue—the
bargaining outcome depends on how patient the players are. If a quick decision is in
the interest of the EU, it will be willing to make more concessions, i.e. higher offers,
to bring the decision process to an end. Besides that, the member state could also be
eager for an immediate compensation: for example, an impatient head of state
would, in view of up-coming elections, welcome quick compensation. Under these
circumstances, the EU has higher bargaining power which results in a lower offer as
it knows that the country in question needs that compensation. When bargaining is
possible, the EU has a first-mover advantage because it makes the first offer M1 can
accept or reject. For how long bargaining will go on depends on the patience of the
players.
5 The effectiveness of the threat of withdrawal considering information
asymmetries
The outside option’s effects on the course of the game and on the extent of possible
transfers depend on
• the benefit loss M1 would suffer due to the decision;
• the benefit loss the country would suffer in case of withdrawal;
• M1’s relevance for to the other members’ integration benefits;
• the extend of EU’s benefit gains following the decision (E).
The decisive factors are, however, whether the benefit levels are truthfully
communicated to the antagonist and whether M1 convincingly signalizes the threat
of withdrawal to the EU. The previous assumption that both parties are completely
informed about their own and their adversary’s utility functions shall be abolished in
the following, while an information asymmetry between both parties is assumed.
If M1 succeeds in pretending a higher benefit loss due to the decision than is
actually the case, or if M1 succeeds in depicting the outside position more favorably
than it is in reality, the country can achieve higher compensations. Having no
withdrawal option, the member country M1 can only react to the EU proposal, while
the explicit withdrawal option enables M1 to act strategically by using an ex ante
threat of withdrawal and to manipulate the process in its favor (by giving wrong
accounts of the own benefit positions) (Koning et al. 2007, p. 6), which finally
results in higher EU proposals.13 M1 can hereby make use of the so-called cheap
talks as ‘‘costless and unverifiable lies about private information and incredible
threats about future actions’’ (Croson et al. 2003, p. 157), leading to negotiation
results that could not be realized without this signal effect (Farrel 1989, p. 229).
13 This theoretic result corresponds to experiments made with regard to this aspect (Schmitt 2003, p. 51).
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From the theoretic perspective, it could be argued that both players anticipate
cheap talk being used during the negotiations. Therefore, they could ignore any
unreliable information and neglect them in the course of the negotiations.
Experiments, however, show different results: responders who either provided
wrong information with regard to their outside option or threatened to refuse low
proposals—in which case neither the proposer nor the responder would get a ‘‘share
of the cake’’—received higher proposals than those who did not convey any
incorrect signals concerning the private information at their disposal or concerning
their preferences (Croson et al. 2003, p. 157).
In a one-shot game,14 M1 consequently could benefit to a great extent from
reinforcing its threat of withdrawal by using cheap talk—it might for example
mention its possible intention to negotiate with other integration areas—and thus
strengthen its negotiation power vis-a`-vis the EU. If, however, cheap talk is revealed
as such, which can be especially the case in repeated games, the result is unlikely to
be positive (Berninghaus and Gu¨th 2002, p. 247). M1’s actions will thus gain
credibility if they are ‘‘self-signaling’’ and finally ‘‘self-committing’’ (Farrell and
Rabin 1996, p. 112). M1 indeed initiating negotiations with other integration areas,
or reducing its payments to the EU budget in order to demonstrate to what extent it
is burdened with growing net payments would be regarded as self-signaling
strategies. M1 herewith signalizes that a withdrawal would provide a higher benefit,
which again raises the credibility of its outside option (Muthoo 2000, p. 159).
The self-committing strategy is considered as a stronger instrument than the self-
signaling strategy: in the former case, M1 would already have initiated its
withdrawal before even having asserted its compensation claims to the EU, thus
supporting its determination to withdraw (Gates and Humes 1997, p. 150). If the EU
is interested in M1 remaining a member of the integration area, it will pay the
amount claimed by M1—whatever it may be. This strategy implies that either M1 is
indifferent with regard to its remaining in the EU and withdrawing from it, or that
M1 is prepared to take risks, hoping that the EU indeed prefers M1 remaining a
member of the integration area to its withdrawing.
In case the member state M1 is only aiming at receiving compensation as high as
possible it would initially use cheap talk—being a cost-effective method—in order
to signalize that it regards the benefit of a withdrawal higher than the benefit of
remaining in the EU. Though a withdrawal from the EU goes at present along with
high economic sunk costs and obstacles15 making a withdrawal quite improbable
and M1’s threat presumably a rather tactical maneuver, it could be appropriate for
the EU to meet M1’s compensation claims: due to existing information asymme-
tries, some uncertainty remains—maybe reinforced by cheap talk—as to whether a
withdrawal might be profitable to M1 anyhow, so that offering some compensation
can be efficient.
14 In case the game is played repeatedly and both players have experienced the cheap talk strategy, cheap
talk will, on the contrary, have little or even negative effects on the negotiation results since the attempt to
deceive may have negative influence on a player’s reputation (Kim 1996, p. 788).
15 A withdrawal can not be initiated just like that if, for example, certain requirements have to be met
beforehand such as a national approval by referendum. It remains therefore debatable whether the mere
threat of withdrawal is per se credible (Schneider 2005, p. 213).
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This result reflects for the most part the history of the EU, where the EU has met
member states’ compensation claims that were linked to the threat of withdrawal in
case of denial.
6 Conclusion and outlook
Over the course of the integration process, the decision rules within the European
Community have undergone several reforms: votes that demand unanimity have
been gradually reduced in favor of decisions by majority in order to accelerate the
decision process in an EU consisting of 27 heterogeneous member states, and thus to
take into account the overall aim of deepening the integration area. Having
enshrined an option of withdrawal, the Treaty of Lisbon now indirectly allows
another voting procedure: in case of a majority decision reducing its previous EU
membership benefit, a member state can now threaten to withdraw in order to
receive compensation for the benefit loss it suffers due to the decision.
Does this mean that member states have regained a negotiation power comparable
to the right to veto? A simple game theoretic approach clarified that—pure benefit-
maximizing behavior and complete information provided—the EU offers higher
compensation in case of an unanimity rule (right to veto) than in case of a decision by
majority with the right to withdraw. In case of a voting procedure with decision by
majority but without a withdrawal option, the least amount of compensation is to be
expected. Member states do therefore regain negotiation power in majority voting
systems with the option to withdraw. However, that power—in terms of the
compensation it could receive—is not as high as in the case of unanimity voting.
Taking into account the results of the ultimatum game experiments, a member
state which refuses to support a decision by majority can expect higher
compensation proposals. In case of a withdrawal option, the maximum amount to
be paid by the EU can—under certain conditions, e.g. if the benefit gain connected
to the decision is less than the benefit loss following a withdrawal—be as high as it
would have been in case of a right to veto.
When extending the model by allowing M1 to negotiate the size of the
compensation, the outcome depends on the patience of the players. For example, if
the EU is impatient in realizing the decision, M1 can count on higher offers.
When group demands are possible, member states can achieve higher compen-
sation in a group than individually, especially when strategic alliances are formed.
When assuming information asymmetries, the extent to which the EU will react
to a threat to withdraw and the amount of compensation it will finally pay depends
on the credibility of such a threat. By increasing its credibility, e.g. by using cheap
talk, the member state can thus force up the EU compensation proposal and may
receive at most the transfer offered in unanimity voting. Indeed member states are
becoming more powerful due to the withdrawal option and as the past has shown,
the EU has repeatedly met member states’ claims, thus giving relevance to the
conclusions of our simple model.
Against this background the model could be extended to analyze what kind of
modifications are to be expected when the game is played several times and the
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results of previous rounds are taken into account. So far, the EU has to a great extent
communicated that it will meet compensation claims. It is however debatable
whether it can and wants to continue this policy in the long run—especially
regarding the fact that the option of withdrawal facilitates claims which, in the form
of exceedingly high payments or of decisions that are not enforced—can in the end
be detrimental to the Community.
To sum up, the right of withdrawal in the Lisbon Treaty has the potential to
impede as well as foster the future European integration process. To prevent abuse
of the exit-option as a threat, conditions raising the exit costs might be attached. One
possibility is to include a referendum that requires the majority of citizens in the
respective member state to vote for withdrawal. As Eerola and Ma¨a¨tta¨nen (2004)
find out, citizens rather prefer the status quo than leaving the EU. This will
especially reduce the bargaining power of euro sceptic politicians as their threat of
withdrawal loses credibility due to the necessary referendum. Another, but more
modest, way is to complicate the exit procedure. For this purpose a period of several
years between the request of withdrawal and the de facto exit could be defined
(Schneider 2005). Another proposal is to claim an exit-fee to compensate the EU for
losses caused by the departure of a member state (Kurrild-Klitgaard 2002). In this
regard, however, it could be difficult to calculate these losses. The remaining
member states could have the incentive to overdraw the exit costs so that the
member state in question might not afford its withdrawal. Any conditions would be
an impediment to the exit-option, thus reducing the benefits of withdrawal. In order
to avoid costly break-ups and to warrant unloaded decisions whether to stay or to
leave no such (costly) conditions have been attached so far in the EU.
An immediate withdrawal of a member state, however, is currently unlikely,
because the advantages of remaining in the EU prevail. But the potential of being
used as a threat should not be underestimated. In addition, the right of withdrawal
might be of relevance to the so-called ‘‘clubs within the club’’16: in order to avoid a
slow down of the integration process, due to the increasing number of decision-
makers and the increasing heterogeneity of economic structures and political
interests, the European Union introduced the possibility of so-called ‘‘enhanced
cooperation’’ between subgroups within the Union. This appears to be an
appropriate instrument which can be applied when not all member countries are
willing or able to participate in specific steps of further integration yet. Applied to
sub-clubs of the EU, the right of secession would allow that clubs within the club
are provided with an exit option, too. Such design with flexible entry and exit
options for clubs within the club will contribute to reduce the trade-off between the
deepening and the enlarging of the EU. Despite the mentioned risks, we conclude
that the right of secession laid down in the Lisbon Treaty is all in all a helpful
institutional adjustment to meet the challenges of today’s European Union.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
16 The EU can be perceived as a club that provides several non-rival but excludable goods to its members
(Ahrens et al. 2005).
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